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Book Review: Simone de Beauvoir and the Politics of
Ambiguity
Best known as the author of The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir also wrote an array of other political and
philosophical texts that are less well known. Together, these constitute an original contribution to political
theory and philosophy, and this book aims to locate Beauvoir in her own intellectual and political context and
demonstrate her continuing significance. Reviewed by Emily Coolidge Toker.
Simone de Beauvoir and the Polit ics of Ambiguity. Sonia Kruks.
Oxford University Press. December 2012.
Find this book: 
Sonia Kruks’ Simone de Beauvoir and the Politics of Ambiguity is a
comprehensive, holistic treatment of  Beauvoir ’s contributions to polit ical
thinking, drawn both f rom the f ull breadth of  her written corpus and f rom her
lived experiences during and f ollowing the German occupation of  Paris.
 Although a great deal of  attention is given to The Second Sex, Kruks is
equally nimble when incorporating Beauvoir ’s lesser-known work, in
particular her work on the elderly and her f orays into f iction – a breadth of
source material which greatly strengthens her contribution to the question at
hand: the nature and possibilit ies of  polit ical agency.
Beauvoir ’s The Second Sex is still very much present in the f eminist
movement. Most f amiliar is the opening line, “One is not born, but rather
becomes, woman,” with which Beauvoir seriously jarred the long-standing equation of  sex and
gender. The latter came to be understood as a complex social construct  – albeit one in which
most women were f ully complicit, and one which had to be internalized to be ef f ective – while the
f ormer remained bound to the physical materiality of  the body. This distinction, between the material body
and the socially- inf luenced ‘psyche’ (f or lack of  a better word), and its implications, is at the heart of
f eminist thought. But that’s not new. What’s new here is the idea that this relationship between our
physicality and the whole of  ourselves as ‘essence made body’ could of f er novel insights into the sphere
of  polit ical action and individuals as polit ical actors.
And this is Kruks’s primary intention: to make the general public aware of  the breadth and relevance of
Beauvoir ’s “prof oundly original and signif icant” contribution to polit ical thinking (p.3). The ambiguity
 ref erred to in the tit le here is crucial, used throughout the book to bring attention to the “paradoxes and
necessary f ailures of  action” in which it results. As such, the word’s original meaning – the ability of
something to be interpreted in two or more equally reasonable ways – bears repeating: in Beauvoir ’s
understanding, this idea is applied both to an action, which can have, presumably, as many legit imate
‘meanings’ as there are people to interpret it, and to the basal condition of  human existence as both a
physical body (acted upon, subject to, and moulded by social conditions) and the more dif f icult- to-pinpoint
‘mind’, which is t ied to (but not necessarily contained within) the body.
Ambiguity, Kruks is caref ul to point out, is not necessarily a strict negative indicative of  f ault; rather, it is to
be seen as a “quality of  phenomena themselves, signif ying their indeterminacy” and, most importantly f or
Beauvoir, is used “to denote relationships in which antithetical qualit ies coexist in agonistic tension” (p.6-7).
The ambiguity most particularly relevant in polit ical action and thought is, in Beauvoir ’s words, “the strange
ambiguity of  existence made body” (p.7), which becomes manif est in the vaporous but undeniable
boundaries between self  and society, and the various means by which a self  and its actions acquire
meaning.
This ambiguity is irresolvable f or the very simple reason that we are not the sovereign, autonomous
consciousnesses theorized by Enlightenment-era humanists; as such, the f irst and most prof ound point
on which Beauvoir (through Kruks) insists, is that we come to terms with the ambiguities and tensions
intrinsic to all action (and inaction).  It is towards this end that Kruks mines Beauvoir ’s work f or examples of
how these ambiguities play out and what meaning they acquire in the polit ical realm.
Let’s look at a specif ic polit ical action: suf f ragette Emily Davison throws herself  under King George V’s
horse in 1913. This action could be legit imately interpreted as one of  rebellion, def iance, accidental death,
terrorism, suicide, martyrdom, and no doubt arguments could be made f or any number of  other
interpretations. Anyone f amiliar with G. K. Chesterton’s Orthodoxy has heard the argument f or suicide and
martyrdom being as polar opposites, and that two such radically dif f erent interpretations are readily
applicable to Emily Davison’s polit ical action is a strong indication that Beauvoir ’s insistence on the
inevitability of  f ailure is not uncalled f or. Add consideration of  Ms. Davison’s intentions and the muddled
soup of  personal and collective concerns to the variety of  possible interpretations and the ambiguity
becomes increasingly multif aceted, and clearly a necessary aspect of  any action.
This does not make Beauvoir a f eather in the cap of  hard-core relativists, by any stretch. Rather, despite
her scorn f or “intransigent moralists” and “moral purists,” Beauvoir considers polit ical “realists” to be an
equally shady example of  “bad f aith” – of  wilf ul ignorance or self -deception, in this case of  too readily
accepting and absolving themselves of  the consequences of  a “realistic” lesser evil. Kruks writes: “this
does not mean that action should not be guided by values. That existence is ambiguous does not mean
that it is absurd or meaningless but rather that ‘its meaning is never f ixed, that it must be unceasingly won’.
Thus, values must f unction as heuristics, as guidelines […] rather than as commands to be f ollowed
blindly” (p.42). Beauvoir of f ers f reedom as guidance f or action, albeit one that neither dictates action (or
inaction) nor “justif [ies] the injuries that a polit ics oriented towards expanding f reedom may produce” (ibid).
While the reader may, at this point, be understandably f rustrated, a thread running throughout the book
provides an important indicator of  the quality of  this ‘f reedom’. This recurring theme is that of  mutual
recognition between individuals of  others’ embodied subjectivity, and can be f ollowed through her analysis
of  Beauvoir ’s discussions of  modes of  dehumanization and oppression in the second chapter (“Theorizing
Oppression”), through the dif f icult acknowledgment of  “the impossibility of  eliminating alterity and
objectif ication f rom human relations” even when one is, in good f aith, doing one’s best to f ulf il the
obligation to struggle against oppressive/dehumanizing practices (discussed most explicit ly in the third
chapter, “Conf ronting Privilege”).
This thread re-emerges in the f ourth chapter, “Dilemmas of  Polit ical Judgement,” as Kruks, through
Beauvoir, explores the implications of  viewing judgments as “acts of  situated f reedom” which “must exceed
the application of  principle” (p.125). She does so primarily through Henri Perron: the f ounder and editor of  a
lef t- leaning independent newspaper in Beauvoir ’s novel The Mandarins who f inds himself , af ter the war,
f acing a series of  dif f icult decisions with regard to his own f uture and the f uture of  his newspaper. Caught
between his desire to isolate himself  f rom polit ics and resume his successf ul writ ing career (to become
“the old Henri”, a desire he ult imately realizes is impossible: the “old Henri” no longer exists), and his
personal loyalty to his mentor and his broader loyalty to the Resistance, the judgements and decisions he
makes are inf ormed by a very messy combination of  emotions (t ied both to personal hopes and ideals, and
to interpersonal relationships) and emotionless practical “reasoning.”
In the last chapter, “’An Eye f or an Eye’: The Question of  Revenge”, Kruks uses Beauvoir ’s discussion of
three dif f erent types of  revenge – the desire f or revenge on one’s own behalf ; on behalf  of  others; and in
the context of  legal prosecution – to tease out the relationships between the subjectivit ies involved, with
the ult imate assertion that revenge always “f ails to accomplish much of  what is desired” (p.161).
The book itself  is organized very much with the student in mind, with each chapter t it led (and very nearly
treated) as a discrete entity; and while some readers may be tempted to do likewise, the progression of
Kruks’ argument throughout the book requires more holistic attention to avoid drawing incorrect or overly
simplistic conclusions about Beauvoir ’s contribution.
Beauvoir, if  presented with this volume, would f ind herself  competently situated both historically and in
polit ical and f eminist theory. And she would f eel herself  certainly among f riends: a great deal of  ink is spilt
def ending Beauvoir against a number of  very specif ic crit icisms, stemming mostly f rom second-wave
f eminists. This attention, while of  course usef ul to a certain extent, nevertheless distracts f rom Kruks’s
much more interesting and original readings of  Beauvoir ’s corpus.
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